Purpose: The paper argues that enterprise culture is producing negative effects. Companies and major accountancy firms are increasingly willing to increase their profits through indulgence in price fixing, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery, corruption, money laundering and practices that show scant regard for social norms and even laws.
Introduction
With the contemporary triumph of enterprise culture and its pursuit of wealth creation, corporations have become the dominant economic, social and political force of our times. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, fifty-one of the hundred largest economies in the world were corporations, not countries. The five largest companies had combined sales greater than the gross domestic product (GDP) of the poorest 46 nations. The combined sales of the top 200 corporations were bigger than the combined economies of all countries minus the big ten, and accounted for over a quarter of world economic activity (Anderson and Cavanagh, 2000) . Such clout has given corporations enormous power and scope for controlling markets, prices, jobs, pensions, news, medicines, food, water, communications, transport and the environment. Yet the power of enterprise culture is not necessarily being used in the wider social interest. With the support of the state, corporations have pursued higher profits by participating in wars, genocide, racism, slavery and repression (Black, 2001; Booth et al., 2007; Klein, 2007) . In the search for competitive advantage, they seem to be willing to indulge in price-fixing, bribery, corruption, money laundering, tax avoidance/evasion and a variety of anti-social activities that affect the life chances of millions of citizens (Baker, 2005; Gasparino, 2005; Kochan, 2006; Connor, 2007; Christensen, 2007) .
The expansion of enterprise culture has been aided by accounting technologies that emphasise private property rights and appropriation of economic surpluses (Johnson, 1972 (Johnson, , 1980 . Auditing technologies seek to foster trust and encourage the belief that companies are not corrupt and their directors are accountable to a variety of stakeholders. Accountancy firms lubricate the wheels of capitalism through a variety of advisory services to enable capital to advance its interests. Through the provision of such technologies many accountancy firms themselves have become international businesses and significant promoters of enterprise culture. They simultaneously share and shape much of the contemporary entrepreneurial culture. The world of accounting is dominated by just four accountancy firms 1 whose combined global income of US$80 billion (Appendix 1) is exceeded by the GDP 2 of only 54 nation states, giving them enormous clout for influencing regulators and contesting unwelcome policies. In recent years, considerable scholarly attention has focused on the expansion and growth of accountancy firms (Hanlon, 1994; Burrows and Black, 1998; Daly and Schuler, 1998; Grey, 1998; Barrett, et al., 2005) , but there is little exploration of the darker side of accountancy firms and whether in pursuit of profits their entrepreneurial energies too might be used for anti-social practices, including price-fixing, bribery, corruption, money laundering and tax avoidance/evasion.
The paper seeks to encourage debates about the consequences of the enterprise culture.
In particular, it seeks to encourage reflections on some questionable practices by accountancy firms which increase profits, but harm citizens. Such practices are located within the broader dynamics of capitalist societies where corporations use a variety of tactics to increase profits and offer high rewards for their executives. Since accountancy firms are also capitalist organisations they are also likely to have absorbed some of these practices. The paper is divided into three further sections. The next section provides a framework for appreciating how enterprise culture might persuade companies to engage in questionable practices to increase private profits.
Some evidence is provided by showing that despite laws and regulatory action, companies continue to engage in price-fixing cartels, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery and corruption and money laundering. The next section focuses upon accountancy firms and argues that the enterprise culture also encourages accountancy firms to engage in questionable practices. Some evidence is provided to show that that despite laws and regulations, accountancy firms too are engaged in price-fixing cartels, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery and corruption and money laundering. As the jurisdiction external auditing is considered to be informed by professional ethics, this section also provides some evidence to show that this arena is susceptible to predatory practices as well. The final section summarises the paper and discusses its significance and implications for research.
THE UNIVERSE OF ENTERPRISE CULTURE
The triumph of the West, western ideas and the alleged exhaustion of viable alternatives to liberalism has anointed capitalism as the dominant social, economic and political system of our time (Fukuyama, 1992) . Corporations, particularly multinational corporations, are the motor of capitalism. With the active support of the state, dismantling of trade barriers, advances in information technologies and through a variety of networks, corporations have become "the most powerful political forces of our time" (Klein 2001, p. 339) .
Though created through law and numerous social contracts, corporations do not owe allegiance to any nation, community or locality (Bakan, 2004) . Elected governments and host communities may be interested in eradicating poverty, promoting education, healthcare and human rights, but corporations may not necessarily share such goals.
They are essentially 'private' organisations and are required by law to prioritise the welfare of shareholders (capital) above other stakeholders. To legitimise their social power corporations may acknowledge some social responsibilities, but they cannot buck the systemic requirement to increase profits and dividends for the benefit of capital. In this competitive process corporations develop new products, services and niches and also squeeze a variety of stakeholders to achieve higher shareholder value (Kennedy, 2000) . This has been accompanied by a variety of strategies to improve corporate earnings through financial engineering, dilution of wages and workers' pension rights (Froud et al., 2006; Mitchell and Sikka, 2006) . Corporate executives are also showing willingness to increase profits by operating cartels and by engaging in or facilitating money laundering, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery and corruption (Connor, 2007; Kochan, 2006; Shaxson, 2007; UK Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006) . Such practices seem to be part of an 'enterprise culture' that persuades many to believe that `bending the rules' for personal gain is a sign of business acumen. Stealing a march on a competitor, at almost any price, to gain financial advantage is considered to be an entrepreneurial skill, especially where competitive pressures link promotion, status, profits, market shares and niches with meeting business targets. With the average tenure of chief executives at major quoted companies at four years, and falling (The (Broder, 2000) . The sheer volume of daily transactions and the related costs of surveillance make regulators selective in their focus and have to assume that corporations will be constrained by laws and social norms. In any case, corporations are able to 'capture' regulators because regulators rely upon 'expert' knowledge and much of this is grounded in the vocabularies and values that privilege corporate interests. Consequently, despite the claimed advances in transparency, accountability and corporate social responsibility, large tracts of business activity remain relatively opaque (Levitt, 2002) . For example, company accounts rarely provide any information about the involvement of corporations in anti-social practices, such as money laundering, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery and corruption, or their social consequences (Mitchell et al., 2002; Murphy, 2006) .
Anti-social practices have negative effects on ordinary people's quality of life and their access to material and symbolic goods and services, but they rarely have the necessary resources to check corporate power and can easily be silenced by laws of libel (Sampson, 2004) . Since corporate power depends on patronage of the state, citizens expect the state to create appropriate regulatory frameworks and make power accountable. As the state's legitimacy depends on mass support it is obliged to be seen to be checking corporate excesses, but this increasingly has to compete with processes that safeguard the long-term wellbeing of capital. In a world system of nation states, some seek competitive advantage and are either unable or unwilling to check predatory enterprise culture (Baker, 2005) . Some lack the political, financial and administrative resources to constrain big business. Neoliberalist ideologies also limit the capacities of the state with claims that robust regulatory activity violates privacy and property rights, stifles innovation, reduces wealth creating opportunities, dilutes economic activities, forces capital to migrate to other less constrained pastures and in the process threatens jobs, social stability and revenues (e.g. taxation) that the state needs for its own survival (Levitt, 2002; Gasparino, 2005) . Inevitably, the state's capacity to develop and enforce regulation is constrained by financial and ideological imperatives. The resulting vacuum has created space for a variety of questionable practices that increase corporate profits but also undermine the social fabric and welfare of citizens.
The remainder of this section provides some evidence about the involvement of corporations in cartels, tax avoidance, bribery and corruption and money laundering.
Cartels
In neoliberal ideology 'the customer is king' and competition offers choices, but numerous companies have operated price-fixing cartels to reduce consumer choice and earn monopoly rents (Connor, 2007 Seemingly, no part of life is immune from cartels.
The above examples provide a brief glimpse of practices crafted by high ranking company executives. These may turn profit maximising directors into media stars, but also squeeze customers, usually hitting the poorest the hardest, by forcing them to pay higher prices. Neoliberals also complain that cartels damage free and competitive markets, but companies appear to have a considerable appetite for such practices.
Tax Avoidance
The availability of taxation revenues are crucial to any attempt by the state to redistribute wealth, alleviate poverty and provide a variety of public goods covering education, healthcare, security, pensions, public transport, clean water and other services and make a difference to quality of life and even survival. Yet corporations often see tax avoidance schemes as simply another 'cost reduction' programme rather than a practice that undermines social solidarity and the development of a just and fair society.
The US, with extreme levels of income inequalities and with it access to education and healthcare is estimated to be losing over $300 billion of tax revenues each year (US The UK Treasury is estimated to be losing between £97 billion and £150 billion of tax revenues, between 8% and 12% of GDP, each year (Mitchell and Sikka, 2006) . The amounts are significant for a country with almost the lowest state pension in Western
Europe (Mitchell and Sikka, 2006 ) and a lamentable record for dealing with child poverty (UNICEF, (2007) . A government study relating to the 700 biggest companies, reported that 220 companies paid no corporation tax and a further 210 paid less than £10m each in -2006 (National Audit Office, 2007 . Around Two thirds of the corporation tax total came from just three industries -banking, insurance and oil and gas. (Mitchell and Sikka, 2005) .
Developing countries may be losing around US$385 billion of tax revenues each year, dwarfing all the loans, donations and foreign aid put together (Cobham, 2005 households; or 240 kilometers of two-lane paved road (World Bank, 2007 ). Yet the thirst for greater corporate profits rarely connects with the consequences for humanity.
Bribery and Corruption
Though somewhat contentious to define, bribery and corruption remain major features of the world economy. In general, the practices involve attempts to gain unfair advantage (Shaxson, 2007) . A large part of bribery and corruption occurs at the interface between the private and public sectors, between government officials and companies seeking competitive opportunities to earn excessive profits by offering kickbacks and secret commissions to intermediaries. According to international financier George Soros, "international business is generally the main source of corruption" (Financial Times, 8 December 1998) and Transparency International adds that "Bribe money often stems from multinationals based in the world's richest countries" (Transparency International, 2007) . Bribery and corruption hurt the poor.
As a UK legislator put it, the "cost of bribes falls primarily on the poor. When a corrupt contractor from this or some other rich country pays a 15 per cent. bribe, he adds that to the price of his contract. His power station or irrigation scheme will cost more, and the little people -those who buy the electricity or the water to irrigate their crops -will pay the price of that bribe. Bribery is a direct transfer of money from the poor to the rich" (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 25 February 1998, col. 374) .
Despite the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD) convention on corruption (OECD,1997), which has been implemented by many countries, the level of corruption and bribery has increased and is estimated to be over 
Money laundering
In the era of electronic transfers of money and easy mobility of capital, money laundering is considered to be a major challenge as it has the capacity to finance corruption, narcotics, smuggling, theft, crime, private armies, pervert democracy and fuel inequalities. goods, money, and illegal arms trade and tax evasion (World Bank, 2007) . Others estimate that after including the cost of fighting, money laundering is estimated to cost the world economy some US2.5 trillion each year (Kochan, 2006) . To combat the threat of money laundering most governments have devised anti-money laundering laws which require banks and financial services entities to implement suitable systems of internal controls and policies to identify their customers and suspicious transactions -sometimes known as "know your customer" (or KYC). Such policies and records can be examined by law enforcement agencies, but are failing as Baker (2005) … the source of his current income is "investment income, rental income, and pension fund payments from previous posts " (p. 147).
ACCOUNTANCY FIRMS
The preceding section explored some aspects of the enterprise culture. It showed that in pursuit of higher profits some corporations indulge in cartels, tax avoidance/evasion, money laundering, bribery and corruption. Some have developed creative compliance strategies. Such practices are partly encouraged by secrecy, poor regulatory environment and the relative absence of any moral constraints. Though accountancy firms distinguish their expert labour from competitors by appealing to claims of professionalism and ethical codes, they too are capitalist organisations whose success is measured by increases in fees and profits. Since making profits by 'bending the rules' is a prominent feature of enterprise culture, accountancy firms may also be susceptible to such practices, especially as their "emphasis is very firmly on being commercial and on performing a service for the customer rather than on being public spirited on behalf of either the public or the state" (Hanlon, 1994, p. 150) . Employees of major firms are inculcated into prioritising the interests of clients and know that their career progression depends on this (Grey, 1998) . In the words of a senior partner, "a firm like ours is a commercial organization and the bottom line is that … the individual must contribute to the profitability of the business … essentially profitability is based upon the ability to serve existing clients well" (Hanlon, 1994, p. 121 11 . Since the late 1970s major firms diversified into a variety of consultancy services to increase their profits (Zeff 2003a (Zeff , 2003b Any temptation to indulge in predatory practices could be checked by reflections on the possible consequences, but experienced observers claim that accountancy firms have a history of "turning a blind eye on the wholesale abuse by client company directors of [legal] provisions" (Woolf,1983, p. 112) and "disclosing considerably less than what they actually know" (Woolf, 1986, p. 511 Perhaps, the conservatism traditionally associated with accounting firms could dampen the zeal to increase profits through predatory activities, but the steady dilution of auditor liability laws has eroded conservative attitudes. As Stiglitz (2003) In principle, the predatory activities of accountancy firms could be checked by regulators, but there are considerable complexities in crafting regulatory structures. In common with other fractions of capital, accountancy firms fund and lobby political parties to secure regulatory concessions (Roberts et al., 2003) . They have enjoyed a close and complex relationship with the state and have been able to marginalise issues about their accountability (Sikka and Willmott, 1995) . In Anglo-Saxon countries, accounting business has enjoyed self-regulation, albeit in a statutory framework, which has primarily been focused on the state guaranteed markets of auditing and insolvency.
The regulatory apparatus has rarely examined the governance of accounting firms, or explored how they negotiate systemic pressures to increase profits (Sikka, 2004) . In general, despite their social power, accountancy firms are not even subjected to the disclosure requirements 13 applicable to equivalent companies or public sector bodies.
Some may look towards standard setting agencies to provide benchmarks for accountancy firm accountability, but major firms often provide finance and personnel to such agencies and are able to stymie threatening developments (Sikka, 2002; Loft et al., 2006) . The burgeoning domestic and international auditing standards are silent on the social obligations of accountancy firms.
Against the background of comparative secrecy, relatively weak liability, accountability, regulatory, moral and ethical pressures, accountancy firms have become key players in the contemporary enterprise culture and have shown a willingness to indulge in questionable practices not only to increase their clients' but also their own profits. The remainder of this section provides some evidence to show that the firms co-operate to operate price fixing cartels and other arrangements to advance their economic interests. This has been accompanied by practices relating to tax avoidance/evasion, bribery and corruption and money laundering. This is also supplemented by evidence relating to the auditing arena to show that questionable practices take place in the accounting firms' traditional jurisdiction as well.
Cartels
There are numerous opportunities for accountancy firm partners to get together auditing … rules to be followed when acquiring new clients in order to protect the market positions of each firm. In particular these rules prohibited any form of competition in relation to each audit firm's "client portfolio". By applying these rules, the auditing firms were able to agree, for example, on how to respond to requests for discounts from client companies, and to establish in advance the firm that would be awarded auditing contracts, in many cases making competitive tendering a mere formality. Other agreements were also designed to ensure anti-competitive behaviour by the auditing firms for public tenders and when establishing agreements with the authorities. …". Senate inquiry found that KPMG created a "Tax Innovation Center" which was treated as a profit centre and its staff were subjected to periodic performance assessments to increase revenues. It also had a "Tax Services Idea Bank" which encouraged staff to submit new ideas for tax avoidance schemes, together with an estimate of the revenue potential and key client targets. The Center "maintained an inventory of over 500 "active tax products" designed to be offered to multiple clients for a fee … The Senate report stated that "None of the transactions examined by the Subcommittee derived from a request by a specific corporation or individual for tax planning advice on how to structure a specific business transaction in a tax-efficient way; rather all of the transactions examined by the Subcommittee involved generic tax products that had been affirmatively developed by a firm and then vigorously marketed to numerous, in some cases thousands, of potential buyers" (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, p. 2). The Senate hearings found that KPMG used "aggressive marketing tactics to sell its generic tax products, including by turning tax professionals into tax product salespersons, pressuring its tax professionals to meet revenue targets, using telemarketing to find clients, using confidential client tax data to identify potential buyers, targeting its own audit clients for sales pitches, and using tax opinion letters and insurance policies as marketing tools" (p. 4). KPMG personnel were trained in cold-calling techniques, instructed to "respond aggressively at every opportunity" (p.50) and disarm sceptical clients with the claims that "many of the [KPMG] specialists are ex-IRS employees … Many sophisticated clients have implemented the strategy in conjunction with their outside counsel" (p. 59). Client presentations were done on chalkboards or erasable whiteboards, and written materials were retrieved from clients before leaving a meeting. Potential clients had to sign "non-disclosure" agreements.
For a number of years US tax professionals have been required to register the tax avoidance schemes marketed by their organisations with the tax authorities. Those failing to do so could face civil and criminal penalties. The Senate report found that despite "its 500 active tax product inventory KPMG has never registered, and thereby disclosed to the IRS the existence of, a single one of its tax products ..." (p. 13). The
Senate report stated that senior tax professionals urged the firm "to knowingly, purposefully, and willfully violate the federal tax shelter law" (p. 13). In an internal communication, a senior KPMG professional reasoned that "the IRS was not vigorously enforcing the registration requirement, the penalties for noncompliance were much less than the potential profits from selling the tax product …" (p.13). The Senate report states for just one of the abusive tax avoidance schemes the "KPMG tax professional coldly calculated the penalties for noncompliance compared to potential fees" and said: "Based upon our analysis of the applicable penalty sections, we conclude that the penalties would be no greater than $14,000 per $100,000 in KPMG fees. ... For example, our average …deal would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a maximum penalty exposure of only $31,000." The senior tax professional also warned that if KPMG were to comply with the tax shelter registration requirement, this action would place the firm at such a competitive disadvantage in its sales that KPMG would "not be able to compete in the tax advantaged products market." (p. 13).
Following the critical Senate report KPMG promised to curb some of its activities, but was soon found to be marketing aggressive avoidance schemes ( 
Money Laundering
Money laundering requires secrecy, knowledge of global financial systems and ability to structure transactions to disguise their origins and destinations. Money laundering is lucrative because intermediaries can collect as much as 20% of the money laundered as a fee (Mitchell and Sikka, 2002) . Regulators claim a "growing role played by professional services providers. Accountants … turn up ever more frequently in antimoney laundering investigations. In establishing and administering the foreign legal entities which conceal money laundering schemes, it is these professionals that increasingly provide the apparent sophistication and extra layer of respectability to some laundering operations (Financial Action Task Force, 1999, p. 12 ; also see Griffin were the directors and the authorised signatories on the company's account at Lloyds Bank. In the case of the first few companies Mr Humphrey was also a director and authorised signatory" (cited in Mitchell et al., 1998a and 1998b) . The strong court judgement should have encouraged regulators to investigate and take appropriate action. Mitchell et al, (1998a Mitchell et al, ( , 1998b approached the police, the Department of Trade, the attorney general, the prime minister and professional bodies, but they all passed the buck, claiming that it was someone else's responsibility. No report or fine has been exacted by any professional body or regulator.
Some of the difficulties of pursuing accountancy firms operating from diverse locations are highlighted by the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI). About two years prior to its forced closure by the UK authorities in 1991, BCCI had been indicted for drug trafficking and money laundering offences by the US regulators and had an "international reputation for capital flight, tax fraud, and money laundering" (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1992, p. 243), but its annual accounts continued to receive unqualified audit reports (Arnold and Sikka, 2001 
Auditing
In the aftermath of unexpected frauds and corporate failures auditors usually come under scrutiny. Regulatory and scholarly attention is often fixed on whether auditors could have detected or reported 'red flags' (Clarke et al', 2003) . However, little attention is paid to how the enterprise culture shaped the production of company audits. This section provides a brief indication of some practices.
In January 1999, following a $2. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This paper has sought to stimulate debates about the contemporary enterprise culture, which is often distinguished by its focus on wealth creation. However, the paper has argued that it is also accompanied by predatory practices which increase profits, but impoverish citizens and societies through the operations of cartels, tax avoidance/evasion, bribery, corruption and money laundering. In pursuit of higher financial rewards, promotions and status, such practices seem to be crafted and sanctioned by highly paid executives at senior levels in organisational structures. In an environment of poor regulation, enforcement, secrecy and lack of ethical constraints, the occasional investigation by regulators and financial penalties do not seem to deter some company executives, or dull the systemic pressures for higher profits and returns.
Some of the practices may not be criminal, but they have negative effects on the welfare of citizens and condemn millions of people to poverty and poor health.
Though appeals to codes of ethics and claims of 'serving the public interest' may camouflage the capitalist nature of accountancy firms, they too are under systemic pressure to increase profits and on occasions have shown a willingness to increase profits through predatory behaviour. Behind a wall of secrecy, some firms have operated cartels, devised aggressive tax avoidance and evasion schemes, engaged in bribery, corruption and money laundering. The rapacious behaviour is also present in the external auditing arena, a jurisdiction traditionally considered to be informed by professional codes of ethics. Firms do not seem to have been constrained by any notion of ethics or morality. Their misdemeanours were not exposed by any professional accountancy body, but by whistleblowers, determined parliamentary investigations and state-backed regulators. Repeated fines and warnings from regulators did not curb violations of rules and anti-social behaviour by accountancy firms. The regulators suspended or restricted the operations of some firms, but even that seems to have a limited effect as firms seem to be keen to pursue higher profits at almost any cost.
Some accountancy firms also coldly calculated that revenues from 'bending the rules' greatly exceeded the penalties and on that basis pursued higher profits. Some firm partners seem to have little hesitation in shredding key documents to aid their clients, or conceal their own role in some debacles. Such policies are not the result of just one or two rotten apples, but appear to be carefully crafted, researched, documented and sanctioned at the highest levels in organisations and are indicative of a rampant enterprise culture that has little regard of the consequences for citizens. Perhaps, this is an inevitable feature of capitalism distinguished by oligopolies where individual firms and corporations are so big that it produces a certain kind of arrogance and makes the senior people believe that they are somehow beyond the reach of the law, regulators and public opinion.
As long as business executives are rewarded for increases in profits there may be economic incentives to engage in predatory behaviour. A strong regulatory response could suggest that corporations and accountancy firms are corrupt, whilst a relatively weak response has evidently failed to curb predatory behaviour and could erode the state's public legitimacy. In principle, higher liability and punishment thresholds have a potential to curb predatory practices, but the prospects of that are low as in a deregulatory environment accountancy firms are campaigning for ever more liability concessions (Sikka, forthcoming) and despite admission of "criminal wrongdoing"
(e.g. by KPMG) regulators are reluctant to closedown the offending firms. In any case, there are limits to the number of transactions and policies that the regulators can scrutinise and will ultimately have to create an environment in which accountancy firms have to be mindful of the consequences of anti-social practices. So the challenge is to develop a research agenda that scrutinises the anti-social aspects of the enterprise culture and develops public policies for constraining predatory behaviour.
Admittedly, the evidence in this paper and the public domain is somewhat limited and 
